The bipartisan report “National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States” has spent an enormous amount of time, energy and financial resources attempting to discover whether there existed systematic intelligence, as well as emergency planning and response inadequacies that contributed to our governments’ failure to prevent and better prepare for the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, 2001. With the publication of the “9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States,” we now have a comprehensive study which addressed these systematic gaps and short falls and makes recommendations to rectify them. The purpose of this article is to discuss these intelligence and emergency preparedness and response fusion issues in the context of this important study and other relevant material. Are We Safer? The central question the commission seeks to address is, “Who, if anyone, is ultimately responsible for the most significant intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor?” But
The Fusion of Intelligence and Emergency ManagementWritten by Glenn Fiedelholtz
Leave a comment
Make sure you enter the (*) required information where indicated. HTML code is not allowed.